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At a delightful dinner not long ago, a former president of the American Finance 
Association mentioned to me that as a behavioral financial economist, I should be a keen 
advocate of regulation to protect investors from themselves. He was quite surprised by 
my reaction, that the behavioral approach in some ways strengthens the case for laissez-
faire, and raises some new doubts about the value of regulation, because much regulation 
is driven by psychological bias—on the part of the proponents, not necessarily the 
regulated. As several authors have argued (Caplan 2001, Daniel, Hirshleifer and Teoh 
2002), individuals have stronger incentives to overcome their biases when investing their 
own money than when making political choices that affect other people’s money. 
My coauthors and I also argued that the modern case for laissez-faire, based upon 
optimality of competitive equilibrium and informational efficiency of capital markets, is 
unduly brittle, in the sense that any market imperfection seems to provide a case for 
regulation. In contrast, a behavioral approach suggests that even though markets work 
imperfectly, the political process usually works even worse.   
My main topic today is not normative, though I return to policy issues at the end 
of this talk. My purpose here is to propose a new positive approach to financial and other 
regulation. The behavioral revolution in finance has mainly taken regulatory structures as 
given, and the applications to regulation have mainly been along the normative lines 
suggested by my dinner companion— examining how to protect naïve investors (e.g., 
Sunstein and Thaler 2003). Meanwhile, positive research on financial regulation, 
following the public choice research program in economics, has focused on the 
interactions of rational selfish pressure groups and political participants.1  
                                                 
1 Some recent studies include Kroszner and Stratmann (1998), Rajan and Zingales (2003), and Benmelech 
and Moskowitz (2007). 
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 A great missing chapter in the theory of financial regulation is the study of how 
irrationality on the part of participants in the political process affects regulatory 
outcomes.2 Such an analysis recognizes that regulators, politicians and voters are subject 
to systematic biases.  I call this approach the psychological attraction approach to 
regulation (and political economy more generally), because certain beliefs about 
regulation are especially good at exploiting psychological biases to attract attention and 
support.3  
If psychological bias affects behavior in capital markets, a fortiori it should affect 
political behavior. A small step toward a psychological approach is the notion that 
‘rational ignorance’ causes individuals to vote foolishly, or not at all (Downs 1957). 
However, rational ignorance alone cannot explain systematic bias. It cannot explain why 
voters would continually make the same mistakes, such as approving protectionism and 
farm subsidies (the foreseeable efforts of pressure groups to manipulate available 
information notwithstanding).  
Nor does rational ignorance explain why some proposed regulations are more 
tempting than others. In a rational setting, the rhetoric of political discourse doesn’t 
matter. I will argue instead that the form of political discourse is crucial.    
                                                 
2 Several books and surveys on financial regulation (e.g., Klapper and Zaidi 2005) do not mention this 
topic; an extensive survey of the law and economics field has only the barest of mentions of psychology 
(Mcnollgast 2007). An overview article by a leading behavioral economist, entitled “Understanding 
Regulation,” does not include a psychological approach in its summary of theories of regulation, nor does it 
mention psychology or behavioral economics (Shleifer 2005, p. 446).  
3 Recent progress is being made; see, e.g., Kuran and Sunstein (1999), Caplan (2001), Murphy and Shleifer 
(2004), and Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler (2006, Section III). Caplan (2007) provides evidence for the 
importance of voter irrationality, and, based on responses to political survey questions, documents a set of 
voter biases. My purpose here is somewhat more general, since regulation is influenced by the biases of 
commentators and regulators, not just voters. More importantly, rather than directly proposing forms of 
political bias, my purpose here is to bring to bear ideas from other fields, such as cognitive and social 
psychology, upon political decisionmaking.  
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Economists have long wondered why harmful policies are so enticing. Inattention 
alone is not the answer; often bad policies are adopted at exactly those times when public 
discourse focuses sharply on them. To understand the form of regulation, we need to 
understand what kinds of information are the most salient, and what kinds of arguments 
are the most alluring. We also need to understand the social process by which naïve 
feelings and beliefs about public policy spread through the media and from person to 
person.  
 I offer today an overview of some social and psychological processes that 
underlie financial and other forms of regulation:  
1. Salience and Vividness Effects 
2. Omission Bias 
3. Scapegoating and Xenophobia 
4. Fairness and Reciprocity Norms 
5. Overconfidence 
6. Mood Effects and Availability Cascades 
7. Ideological Replicators 
These items reflect both individual biases and (especially items (6) and (7)) the social 
processes that amplify them. My purpose is to suggest ways in which bias may affect 
regulation, rather than to systematically weigh alternative possible explanations. I 
consider the above seven effects in sequence, and conclude by discussing the 
implications of the psychological attraction approach for public policy. 
 
1. Salience and Vividness Effects    
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Politics is the struggle for attention. The power of simplistic sound bites 
exemplifies the fact that constraints on information processing affect every aspect of 
public debate. Political competitors craft slogans to make their positions plausible, easily 
understood, and remembered. 
Psychological research has studied what makes stimuli easy to encode and 
retrieve. Attention is drawn to salient stimuli that contrast with other stimuli in the 
environment, and to vivid stimuli, such as stories about personal experiences, and 
emotionally arousing information (Nisbett and Ross 1980, p. 45). 
As a result, regulatory debates are influenced heavily by extreme events, and by 
heart-rending personal stories. For example, the Enron scandal (together with accounting 
fraud at WorldCom and other firms) helped set the stage for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 (or SOX), a major change to U.S. reporting regulations. An exceptionally vivid 
aspect of the disaster was the ruin of employees who had large fractions of their 
retirement assets invested in Enron stock. Managers had led employees to believe that 
Enron stock was a great investment for retirement, even while selling their own shares. 
(This was in violation of fairness and reciprocity norms, the topic of Section 4.)  Enron 
provided simple dramatic narratives about heartless exploitation and pride coming before 
a fall which the media imparted with relish.        
Protecting employees who invest in own-company stock was not the primary 
explicit motivation for SOX.4 However, together with other high-profile accounting 
frauds, the emotion-laden publicity from Enron helped establish an anti-business public 
                                                 
4 Some linkage of the two issues is seen in a January 15, 2002 press release by the U.S. Senate Committee 
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs indicating that Senator Paul Sarbanes had written two letters to 
the General Accounting Office, one requesting that the GAO investigate investment by employees of 
retirement funds in company stock, and the other that the GAO explore the adequacy of financial reporting 
in the U.S. (U.S. Senate Banking Committee, 2002). 
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mood (see, e.g., Romano 2005, pp. 1524-6) that created intense pressure for a regulatory 
response. 
The costs of disclosure regulation imposed by SOX upon general shareholders are 
much less vivid than poignant stories about families ruined by lies and cheating. Indeed, 
the costs of SOX to general shareholders can be integrated with the overall profit that 
firms generate, so that general shareholders are still perceived as not incurring losses on 
their holdings. This integration effect applies to many regulations that quietly impose 
costs on all shareholders.  
More generally, the costs of a regulation, though widely incurred, are often far 
less salient than the exceptional wrongdoings that incited it. For example, management 
time and attention are intangible. Furthermore, people underweight the probabilities of 
event contingencies that are not explicitly available for consideration (Fischoff, Slovic, 
and Lichtenstein 1978, Tversky and Koehler 1994). So we expect planners to 
underestimate the costs of unexpected side effects of regulation. For SOX, several 
observers have argued that the costs in management time and of a shift in focus of boards 
of directors from business guidance to legal compliance were greater than expected 
(Committee on Capital Markets Regulation 2007, Perkins 2007). 
 
Loss Salience 
Loss aversion is the distaste for losses as measured relative to an arbitrary 
reference point (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), an aspect of what psychologists call 
‘negativity bias.’ Framing matters—a given consumption level is perceived differently 
when described as a gain versus a loss. What I call loss salience extends this notion to the 
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social sphere; we care more about the financial losses than the financial gains of others 
(Wilson, Arvai, and Arkes (2006) provide related experimental evidence).  
Loss aversion and loss salience probably derive from more fundamental sources, 
such as the tendency to make dichotomous evaluations as a cognitive short-cut 
(Hirshleifer 2001). A propensity to focus on losses relative to a status quo position also 
has evolutionary value as a way of inducing individuals to monitor and protect property.     
The focus of individuals on losses is amplified at the social level to the extent that 
conversation or media reporting are biased toward transmitting adverse and emotionally 
charged news. News media tend to report the shocking and horrible (“If it bleeds, it 
leads”); individuals also pass on stories that elicit disgust more readily than those that do 
not (Heath, Bell, and Sternberg 2001).   
 For financial judgments and decisions as well, losses are especially salient. 
Analysis of risk often takes the form of studying worst-case scenarios rather than 
measures of risk such as variance that reflect the full probability distribution of outcomes. 
Risk perceptions focus upon the potential for loss both in the general population (Yates 
and Stone 1992, Loewenstein et al 2001), and among analysts and investors (Olsen 1997, 
Koonce, McAnally, and Mercer 2005). Loss salience explains the appeal of the Value at 
Risk methodology for risk management, which focuses on ‘maximum possible loss’ as a 
risk measure.  
Media reporting of salient derivatives losses, such as those in the Barings fiasco, 
creates an association in observers’ minds of derivatives with losses. A failure to consider 
the concept of hedging creates a perception that derivatives are always dangerous. These 
attentional effects create pressures to regulate derivatives. 
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2. Omission Bias and Associated Norms  
According to Ilana Ritov and Jonathan Baron (1990), omission bias is “the 
tendency to favor omissions (such as letting someone die) over otherwise equivalent 
commissions (such as killing someone actively).” For example, subjects recommend 
against vaccination of a child even when the likelihood of death from vaccination is much 
lower than the reduction in the likelihood of death from disease. Omission bias also 
explains why students of economics find the concept of opportunity cost surprising.        
Corporate hedging is much more likely than a vaccination to cause an adverse 
‘side effect’ (losses). Observers who are subject to omission bias will detest hedging 
losses, since these could be avoided by not hedging. Ex ante, observers who fear 
derivatives losses may perceive a risk-reducing hedge as increasing risk. 
 Similarly, omission bias can deter making purchases to diversify into seemingly 
risky assets, such as the Vietnam stock market, or real estate.5 Refraining from investing 
in Vietnam equities before they rise is a mere omission, but buying into Vietnam is a 
commission, making any resulting loss especially painful. 
Regulation by government or other institutions to protect unsophisticated 
investors from supposedly dangerous securities or asset classes can block risk-reducing 
diversification. For example, Del Guercio (1996) discusses how U.S. courts usually 
evaluate whether an asset is a prudent investment in isolation rather than as part of a 
portfolio. She documents that institutions that are subject to especially stringent 
                                                 
5 The failure to diversify probably also reflects familiarity bias (Huberman 2001, Cao, Hirshleifer, Han, and 
Zhang 2007, Massa and Simonov  2006), narrow framing (viewed in isolation, volatile assets seem risky; 
Barberis and Huang 2006), and limited cognition (not understanding the risk-reducing effects of 
diversification). 
  8
prudential standards tilt their portfolios away from ‘low quality’ stocks. Prior to the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the prudent-man rule for 
pension funds required a prudent selection of each security in the portfolio considered in 
isolation; it is only with ERISA that the fiduciary was directed to consider prudence of 
the investment with regard to its role in the overall portfolio (Cummins and Westerfield 
1981). Omission bias also helps explain pension rules in some time periods and countries 
limiting diversification into major asset classes such as international, rules that limit 
trading of the stock of privately held firms, and rules that limit participation in hedge 
funds to ‘qualified’ investors. 
 
3.  Xenophobia and Scapegoating 
People tend to prefer members of their own group to outsiders, a phenomenon 
called in-group bias. An intense form is xenophobia: fear of or hostility toward strangers 
or foreigners. An evolutionary basis for these psychological propensities is provided by 
kin selection (Hamilton 1964).   
A further deep-rooted source of conflict is self-serving attribution bias; in 
interactions with others, we think we are in the right and others in the wrong. This bias 
extends to group-serving interpretations as well (Taylor and Doria 1981), in the extreme 
causing fanatical antagonism toward other groups (Beck 2000, p. 7). Social processes 
such as self-censorship in conversation can further exacerbate xenophobia (Kuran 1995). 
Xenophobia can help explain regulation of foreign shareholding and control of 
domestic companies.6 Regulatory permission for cross-national takeovers are politically 
                                                 
6 There is evidence that citizens of Europe have less trust for countries with different religions and lower 
genetic similarity, and that this lower trust leads to less trade (especially in trust-intensive goods), portfolio 
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delicate, especially when heavily reported in the press. In part for patriotic reasons, many 
countries have government ownership of airlines or firms in other key industries. 
When things go wrong, people eagerly look for someone to blame. Blame is laid 
upon some visible, disliked, and relatively weak out-group, a phenomenon known as 
scapegoating (Aronson, Wilson, Akert 2006). Regardless of whether there really was 
villainous behavior, scapegoating creates support for regulation to avert future 
misconduct. With regard to risks of plunging into own-company stock as in the Enron 
debacle, teaching or pressuring investors to diversify out of own-company stock is 
relevant, whereas financial disclosure rules are not. However, placing the burden of 
change upon potential victims feels unjust. It is far more intuitive to act against 
scoundrels.   
 Economic and stock market downturns increase pressure for regulation. Examples 
include the depression era Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, and the Sarbanes-Oxley 
legislation that followed the millennial high-tech collapse. The psychological attraction 
approach offers a simple explanation—the urge to find someone to blame. The possibility 
that a bubble could be a spontaneous result of investor biases and social amplification 
processes is not vivid, simple, or repeatable.  Chance and personal incompetence are also 
not satisfying as explanations for personal losses. Villainy, especially on the part of a 
despised group, is more salient and more flattering to our self-esteem. Regardless of 
whether misconduct had any important macro effect, a cast of villains can be found. 
Explanations based on villainy (that regulators succumbed to political pressures, that 
                                                                                                                                                 
investment, and direct investment (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2006). Morse and Shive (2006) provide 
evidence that within regions in the U.S., greater patriotism is associated with greater home bias in portfolio 
holdings. 
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analysts and investment banks were lying, and so forth) also have the appealing feature 
that they readily suggest simple cures—through regulation.  
 Speculators are favorite targets for vilification after market declines. Hard times 
also trigger vilification of lenders as greedy exploiters, also leading to demands for 
regulation. For example in his first inaugural address in 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt 
attacked “unscrupulous money changers,” and called for  “…two safeguards against a 
return of the evils of the old order; there must be a strict supervision of all banking and 
credits and investments; there must be an end to speculation with other people's 
money…” 
  
4. Fairness and Reciprocity Norms 
Inconsistent norms of behavior coexist within people’s minds, supported by 
strong feelings. Three important norms of behavior are reciprocity, equality, and charity. 
Reciprocity, or fair exchange, requires no taking without giving. Equality requires equal 
division of resources. Charity requires acting to relieve distress— distress often being 
identified with recent losses, rather than absolute wealth levels. These norms have a basis 
in evolved human psychology, but are also culturally spread and enforced. 
The equal division norm is reflected, for example, in progressive income taxes, 
and, in experiments on resource transfer games, the tendency of individuals to share 
equally (Camerer and Thaler 1995, Hoffman et al 1998). Although competition for status 
and dominance was surely an aspect of human evolution, in many hunter-gatherer 
societies subordinate males collude to restrain potential dominants (Boehm 1999) . 
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Whatever their function, feelings of envy motivate efforts to limit the power and wealth 
of important individuals. 
Envy and the salience of the equality norm are intensified when a group is doing 
poorly, which helps explain the contempt held for rich CEOs who lay off blue collar 
workers. Such attitudes explain regulation of managerial compensation in the U.S., such 
as corporate taxation of executive salaries greater than $1 million, and recent proposals to 
require an annual shareholder advisory vote for executive compensation plans. 
In order to support mutually beneficial exchange,7 the norm of reciprocity also 
requires the punishment of violators. A readiness to succumb to uncontrollable rage has 
strategic value as a means of commitment (Hirshleifer 1987, Frank 1988, Nesse 2001); 
we don’t step on the toes of someone who will wreak terrible vengeance. Insults or 
damage to a group that an individual deeply identifies with also provoke fierce anger. 
The thirst for vengeance against perceived wrongdoers can go too far, imposing 
heavy social costs. For example, in the U.S. anger by juries against corporate misconduct 
motivate unpredictable ‘jackpot’ litigation awards. The prospect of large uncontrollable 
losses distorts choices and presumably deters innovation.  
The scapegoating of speculators and lenders derives in part from reciprocity 
norms. The idea that intermediation adds value is unintuitive. Cognitive effort is needed 
to recognize that shifting a resource across locations or over time creates a different 
product. Intermediating merchants are therefore often viewed as parasites, and their price 
margins as proof of cheating.    
                                                 
7 Double-blind experiments on the ‘trust game’ show that there is much more trust and reciprocation than is 
predicted by the rational egoistic model, with reciprocation mediated by the release by the brain of the 
neuroactive hormone oxytocin (Zak, Kurzban, and Matzner 2004). McAdams and Rasmusen (2006) discuss 
evidence that reciprocity norms (specifically, promise-keeping norms) are very important for market 
exchange.  
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Product middlemen (such as traveling merchants) have often been vilified as price 
gougers; advertising and marketing are also frequently condemned as unproductive. The 
medieval concept of the just price held that the just price is equal to the cost to the seller 
(Southern 1968, p. 376), in which case profit is exploitation. Furthermore, buyers are not 
aware of all the costs incurred by middlemen—direct costs of geographical transport and 
storage, inventory wastage, and costs of product marketing. As a result, buyers 
underestimate costs and think they are victims of price-gouging. 
The notion that middlemen provide little real value is implicit in the saying 
“eliminate the middleman.” Often through history the elimination has been violent, going 
at least as far back as the biblical account of Jesus ejecting foreign exchange dealers from 
the temple. English common and statute law starting in the Middle Ages made 
commodity speculation a crime (Herbruck 1929), with severe punishments for violators. 
 The norm of equality creates hostility toward lenders, since it is the rich who have 
the resources to lend. Self-serving attribution bias also contributes; denigrating the lender 
helps maintain the self-esteem of impecunious borrowers when repayment is due. The 
charity norm suggests that high product prices and interest rates are objectionable when 
the client is poor or recently distressed. 
 The norm of reciprocity is a crucial part of the case against usury. A zero interest 
rate seems fair because people neglect the fact that the same amount of money is worth a 
different amount at different dates. This confusion influenced medieval Christian views 
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on usury, which reflected Aristotle’s position that money is barren (i.e., it does not 
reproduce like an animal or crop; Southern 1968).8       
The social benefits to speculative activity are especially subtle and abstract. These 
include the shifting of resources to protect against shortfalls, providing a means for 
inventors to reap rewards from their activities (Hirshleifer 1971), and making asset prices 
more efficient, thereby guiding productive transformations. Popular discussions seldom 
acknowledge these benefits. Speculators are instead viewed as profiting at the expense of 
others in a zero sum game. 
The apparent costs to society of speculation are much more salient. The 
correlation of speculative profits from commodities with high prices to consumers 
encourages an inference that speculation raises prices, causing hardship. Indeed, Adam 
Smith compared the fear of speculators to the fear of witches. The correlation of 
speculative activity in securities with market volatility and crashes is often confused with 
causality. This is especially the case for short sellers, who help prices adjust downward. 
It’s tempting to kill the bearer of ill tidings when the bearer is getting rich from the 
tidings.   
Security regulations in many countries are designed to limit speculation. These 
include higher taxation of short-term capital gains, securities transaction taxes, and 
restrictions or bans on short-selling. Biased attitudes toward speculation also tarnish 
perceptions of derivatives, which are perceived as instruments of manipulative wheeling 
and dealing.  Of course, manipulation often occurs, and has important effects. But the 
                                                 
8 A further possible source of modern usury legislation and opposition to price gouging is disapproval of 
interest rates or prices deviate greatly from ‘reference prices’ to which people have grown accustomed 
(Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler 1998, p. 1511-12). 
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perception that derivatives serve no legitimate purpose makes them unduly attractive 
targets for regulation.  
 
5. Overconfidence 
We are experienced with the everyday problems of personal life. Generally, the 
more energetically we attack them, the better we do. A natural mistake is to extend the 
can-do attitude of personal life to the societal level. It is much harder to make good 
decisions on behalf of millions of interacting strangers with diverse preferences and 
information. As emphasized by Adam Smith (1776) and Friedrich Hayek (1978), there is 
a spontaneous order—a web of coadaptations brought about by individual decisions—
which is impossible for a central planner to understand in full detail. 
Markets represent the accumulation of creative solutions to problems—some 
carefully designed, others (as with biologically evolved adaptations) the happy outcome 
of trial and error. The human mind evolved to understand social interaction in terms of 
individual causes and effects. It was not designed to intuitively grasp the effectiveness of 
market institutions that developed through a process of long-run and large-population 
evolutionary development. (I refer to selection on and evolution of business practices, not 
people.) The entire concept of a spontaneous order in markets was not developed until the 
18th century, and evolution by natural selection was not understood until the 19th century. 
The failure of socialism demonstrates the futility of trying to direct an economy 
from the top down. In market economies, individuals can in some cases largely ‘undo’ a 
new regulation, incurring some deadweight cost along the way. In other cases 
intervention leads to unforeseen distortions. More fundamentally, value-increasing 
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interventions are scarcer at the societal level than at the personal level because it is only 
at the societal level that market failure is a prerequisite for intervention to be useful.  
A lack of understanding of the idea of spontaneous order, combined with general 
attentional constraints, make regulatory solutions to perceived problems too appealing. 
The public wants government to do something about problems, which implicitly assumes 
that a useful intervention exists. Also, the act of proposing a solution is a signal that the 
proposer thinks the solution has value. Voters who do not analyze proposals deeply react 
to this signal credulously. 
Overconfidence is the belief that one’s personal qualities are better than they 
really are. An overconfident individual also does not fully recognize and adjust for his 
own limitations. Overconfidence helps explain excessive activism in regulatory 
strategies, just as it has been found to explain excessively active trading strategies (Odean 
1999). 
 Overconfident policy analysts too readily assume that a perceived social problem 
has not been addressed by the market, and are too sure of proposed remedies. If the 
average potential remedy will make things worse, overconfidence leads to the adoption of 
too many remedies.9 Even economists who understand the general notion of spontaneous 
order do not always internalize fully, in specific contexts, the richness of adaptation of 
economic institutions. A possible illustration is the proposal of transactions taxes in asset 
markets to limit speculation.   
                                                 
9 Another way of putting this is that there are many ways to regulate, and only one way not to regulate. 
Suppose that the average contemplated regulation is undesirable, that an individual forms an independent 
assessment of each contemplated regulation (modeled as independent identically distributed signals), and 
that he overestimates the accuracy of his assessments. Then by chance a lot of undesirable regulations will 
seem desirable. A rational individual discounts appropriately for this ‘regulator’s curse,’ as proven in a 
more general context by Rasmusen (1992), but an overconfident individual does not. 
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Transactions taxes imposed for this purpose are prevalent internationally, and 
have been proposed repeatedly in the U.S., both in broad-based forms, and targeted at 
derivative securities (Hakkio 1994). Proponents have included leading economists such 
as Keynes and Tobin and, after the 1987 stock market crash, Joseph Stiglitz and 
Lawrence Summers (Stiglitz 1989, Summers and Summers 1989). 
Just as a tariff is like a negative railroad, a transactions tax on stock trading is a 
destroyer of liquidity—at first glance a bad thing. I focus on arguments for transactions 
taxes based upon the claim that excessive speculation leads to overreactions, excess 
volatility, and capital misallocation.10 My purpose here is not to weigh the pros and cons 
of transactions taxes, but to illustrate how even sophisticated policymakers can neglect 
market adaptations. 
Proponents of securities transactions taxes have not, to my knowledge, discussed 
how markets might be able to address excessive trading. Exchanges influence the 
liquidity of securities through a variety of means, such as designating a market maker 
with an affirmative obligation to maintain liquidity.11 Firms make choices about their 
liquidity too. Many firms never go public at all, and many public firms have gone private, 
thereby creating their own ‘transactions taxes.’ Some public firms, such as Warren 
Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway, don’t split their stocks, resulting in high stock prices 
which limit trading. Firms choose which exchange to list on. In some exchanges there is 
independent negotiation between listed firms and agents about how to create liquidity for 
their stocks. Firms can also reduce liquidity through nondisclosure, which increases 
                                                 
10Proponents have also made investigative externality arguments that do not rely on mispricing. 
11A possible rationale for having a designated market maker with an affirmative obligation to maintain 
liquidity is to internalize externalities among marketmakers and other traders, since the adverse selection 
costs borne by marketmakers are distributive, not social costs (Bessembinder, Hao, and Lemmon 2007). 
  17
adverse selection problems in stock trading. Some mutual funds have front- and back-end 
loads to manage inflows and outflows; and some funds choose a closed-end form that 
takes flow decisions out of investor hands. 
So if excessive trading creates externalities, there are many potential avenues for 
internalizing them. This does not prove that transactions taxes are a good or bad idea. 
What these points illustrate is that academics have neglected the possibility that some of 
the potential social costs of irrational speculative trading could be internalized by the 
market.  
Suppressing the opinions of speculators by taxing stock trading is analogous, in 
an intellectual setting, to suppressing ideas by taxing speech. Irrational investors 
overreact in their trades, but internet bloggers and college professors also disseminate 
immoderate opinions. Taxing the internet or universities might shift discourse into more 
reasonable directions. But for some reason, people are more sympathetic to suppressing 
opinions that are expressed through trading than those that are expressed through speech. 
It’s hard to see why financial speculation would be more dangerous than intellectual 
speculation. 
 
Managing Market Fluctuations 
We expect public officials and media kibitzers to be overconfident about their 
ability to helpfully manage market fluctuations. Many think that they can identify useful 
strategies for managing interest rates or money supply to ‘cool overheated stock markets’ 
or ‘lift the economy out of recession.’ The better-than-average effect (a manifestation of 
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overconfidence) encourages regulators to think that they are better than investors at 
identifying the market’s value.  
The illusion of control, another aspect of overconfidence, tempts observers to 
think that they know how to avert bubbles and crashes. After adverse outcomes, this leads 
commentators to condemn as inadequate the existing regulator or regulatory system. Such 
outcomes incite calls for more active intervention and new regulation. 
Another example of high policy analyst confidence in a negative railroad solution 
is a recommendation made by the Commission on the Regulation of U.S. Capital Markets 
in the 21st Century. Managers hate to miss earnings forecasts, which usually results in a 
big drop in stock price. A principal recommendation of the Commission is that public 
companies stop issuing earnings forecasts (known as ‘guidance’), or at most give annual 
instead of quarterly guidance, and a range forecast instead of a single number. In other 
words, firms should make corporate disclosure limited, infrequent, and noisy. The 
counterintuitive nature of this recommendation suggests trying to understand the source 
of its appeal. 
There are indeed agency problems and inefficiencies associated with earnings 
forecasts and earnings management (DeGeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser 1999, Richardson, 
Teoh and Wysocki 2004). However, before seeking a regulatory solution, we need to 
understand why the market has not already adopted it. Firms are already free to refrain 
from making forecasts, and investors are free to discount such forecasts.  
The fact that the market reacts sharply to missed earnings forecasts suggests that 
investors view quarterly earnings guidance (as well as earnings realizations) as highly 
informative about long-run prospects. This is what creates incentives to manipulate 
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earnings to meet forecasts. Such manipulation may add noise, but scrapping the signal is 
like adding infinite noise. 
 The argument that investors focus too much on quarterly earnings forecasts or 
announcements seems to have no empirical support. Earnings surprises are positive 
predictors of future returns (Bernard and Thomas 1989). This suggests that the market 
underreacts to the information contained in quarterly earnings news. 
 Of course, it is conceivable that externalities and market inefficiencies make 
intransparency desirable, and that market forces pressures firms to be too transparent. 
However, I will later argue that support for policies designed to combat short-termism are 
primarily driven by a different force: irrational ideology. 
 
6. Mood Effects and Availability Cascades   
Psychologists distinguish two cognitive systems for making judgments and 
decisions: one that is fast, intuitive, affect driven, and automatic, the other slow, 
controlled, and analytical (Kahneman 2002). Heuristic decisionmaking based on gut 
feelings works well within some domains, but when misapplied to domains that require 
careful analysis, can cause big mistakes. Short-term moods affect even judgments and 
decisions relating to long term prospects. Since mood is contagious (Hatfield, Cacioppo, 
and Rapson 1994), such errors can aggregate to the societal level.  
Even rational inference processes can cause judgments about regulation to 
become prevalent based upon little information. When commentators assert that a new 
regulation is needed, it is rational to infer that they have some reason to do so. This 
inference recruits further support for the measure, potentially creating an information 
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cascade in which many defer to the conventional position (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and 
Welch 1992, Banerjee 1992). Instincts for conformity can reinforce this tendency, so that 
common mistaken judgments solidify to become seemingly uncontestable truths.  
Hazards tend to gain widespread public attention in intense bursts. In the 
availability heuristic of Tversky and Kahneman (1973), individuals judge the frequency 
or importance of a phenomenon according to their ability to remember examples of it. As 
a result, as pointed out by Timur Kuran and Cass Sunstein (1999), the more that people 
talk about a risk or problem, the more important it seems, a self-reinforcing cycle which 
they call availability cascades. News media amplify availability of threats selectively. 
For example, horrifying risks such as shark attacks seem more common than they really 
are because they are newsworthy. 
In an availability cascade, as media or general public opinion swings toward one 
position, the presentation of evidence becomes increasingly one-sided in favor of that 
position. Psychology experiments find that people do not discount adequately for the one-
sidedness of evidence, even when the one-sidedness is explicit (Brenner, Koehler, and 
Tversky 1996). As a result, during an availability cascade that centers upon a perceived 
threat, the political pressure for government to do something to avert it becomes 
irresistible. For example, owing to vivid major scandals after the turn of the third 
millennium, corporate fraud and angry moral judgments expressed against corporate 
wrongdoers had high availability, creating enormous political pressure for action by the 
U.S. Congress.   
Psychological evidence indicates that negative mood is associated with greater 
pessimism and critical thinking. This suggests that after bad news we will see a push for 
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new precautionary regulation. Furthermore, during bad times when firms become 
distressed and manipulation activities are revealed, public attention focuses more on 
misconduct. As a result, there is pressure for tightening financial controls, and there is 
greater litigation against alleged wrongdoers. The benefit to availability entrepreneurs 
such as public prosecutors from taking action against perceived misconduct or gray area 
activities increases. As more wrongdoers are sued and imprisoned, news about 
misconduct becomes even more available in the media. Thus, tightening of the regulatory 
environment is self-reinforcing. 
 
7. Ideological Replicators  
 Why is there so much economic and financial regulation, often dysfunctional? For 
example, socialism once held sway disastrously over much of the planet. Yet anti-market 
ideology remains popular, and is a wellspring of economic regulation. 
 To explain these phenomena, I now consider how ideologies—religious, political, 
and economic—shape financial regulation. Ideologies exist because they are good at 
catching our cognitive and emotional hooks, which enables them to spread from person to 
person. In the terminology of Richard Dawkins, ideologies are cultural replicators, or 
memes. In particular, ideologies are assemblies of more basic memes—very simple 
propositions or ideas that affect our thoughts and actions.  
Religious ideology directly affects financial regulation, as with prohibitions on 
usury, and attitudes toward inequality. Utopian ideologies like communism engage the 
deep feelings associated with the equality norm to reject private property. Such a 
rejection was shared by Plato and early Christian thinkers. Ideologies of class conflict 
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incite envy of the rich, and promote the idea that business activity is evil. One of the 
world’s great charitable institutions, Hollywood, incessantly depicts businessmen as 
thieves and murderers.  A disdain for trade on the part of intellectuals, aristocrats, and the 
ancien riche goes back to ancient times; critics of trade include such thinkers as Aristotle, 
Confucius, and Thomas Aquinas.  
The meme that commerce is a zero-sum game reinforces the socialist meme 
assembly. Survey evidence shows such beliefs to be common (Rubin 2002). Zero-sum 
views of trade are more appealing in a stagnating economy, in which people crave 
explanations and scapegoats for their hardships. Utopian mass movements thrive during 
times of change and dislocation, when individuals with damaged self-regard seek a cause 
outside themselves (Hoffer 1963). The psychological attraction approach therefore 
predicts a shift toward socialism in hard times and toward free liberalism during times of 
growth and innovation. 
 
The Ideology of Anti-Short-Termism 
To see more specifically how a financial ideology can exploit psychological bias 
to promote its own replication, consider again the allegations that public companies that 
markets and firms are too focused on the short run. During the 1980s popular discussion 
held that American business is overly focused on the short-term, and criticized the short-
term pressures placed on firms associated with takeovers, leverage, and investors with 
short time horizons. The alleged bad consequences were uncompetitiveness, 
underinvestment, and lack of innovation. Japan was cited with fear and envy for its 
putatively superior corporate model of long-term focus. 
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In retrospect, this comparison is deeply ironic. But the failure of this worldview to 
forecast the economic performance of Japan versus the U.S. in the 1990s does not seem 
to have damaged its credibility much. Its ability to persuade has also survived the 
opposing evidence provided by the millennial tech boom. I argue that psychological bias 
makes criticisms of short-termism attractive, and that this has led to the evolution of an 
ideology of anti-short-termism.  
Ideologies evolve by adding highly contagious and complementary memes and 
discarding feeble or incompatible ones. It is much more important that propositions be 
superficially plausible and emotionally strong and compatible than that they be logical. 
For example, critics of short-termism routinely conflate five distinct propositions: that 
firms are focused on short-term stock prices, that firms underinvest, that firms don’t 
innovate enough, that firms are overleveraged, and that the stock market is fixated upon 
short-term information signals (an informational inefficiency). 
Actually, since the stock market on average reacts positively to increases in 
capital expenditures, an attempt by managers to boost short-term stock prices can 
promote overinvestment (Trueman 1986). Indeed, the attempt to boost short-term stock 
prices can distort firms’ decisions away from routine projects toward innovative ones 
(Chordia, Hirshleifer, and Lim 2001). As for the proposition that the stock market is 
obsessed with the short-term, empirically the stock market seems to overvalue growth 
opportunities—consider, for example, the value effect. Nor is there consistent evidence 
that the market overreacts to short-term earnings-related news, or that firms are 
overleveraged.12 
                                                 
12There is evidence that markets overweight certain kinds of quarterly earnings information—accruals 
(accounting adjustments), and especially their discretionary components (Sloan 1996, Teoh, Welch, and 
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Nevertheless, the five concepts of short-termism complement each other to form a 
more contagious and virulent ideology. Although logically distinct, these memes 
manipulate our psychological biases in similar ways, by exploiting our high regard for 
self-discipline and foresight. Labeling all the distinct propositions ‘short-termism’ 
recruits our preexisting mental equipment for thinking about morality and sin, folly and 
wisdom, ant and grasshopper. By expanding the range of circumstances in which the 
notion of short-termism is called to mind, the joining of these memes makes each more 
memorable.13 
Moralistic interpretation dominates public discussion of short-termism.14 In 
personal life, heavy borrowing for consumption is improvident; popular discussion 
mistakenly extends this norm to firms that are borrowing to invest or to shift capital 
structure.  
Moralistic interpretation also feels good. It provides a satisfying narrative in 
which sin and folly are followed by punishment by means of the collapse of improvident 
firms. Criticizing the defects of others boosts our self-esteem, and helps us gain status by 
signaling to others the purity of our own moral standards.   
Also vital to the success of an ideology are wide applicability and imperviousness 
to refutation. The ideology of anti-short-termism widens it applicability by absorbing an 
eclectic set of emotionally-related themes. This menu of themes makes it easy to attribute 
                                                                                                                                                 
Wong 1998ab). My purpose here is not to deny the possible existence of harmful short-term pressures, but 
to point out that several data fail to support major elements of the anti-short-termist meme assembly. 
13 There is seldom any attempt to reconcile the different pieces of anti-short-termism ideology coherently. 
Often the same commentators who scathingly criticize firms and investors for being obsessed with short-
term earnings are also contemptuous of investors who, during the late 1990s, placed too little weight on the 
fact that the profits of dot-com firms were negative—a complaint about excessive long-termism. 
14 In Berenson (2003), a focus on quarterly earnings announcements, the “cult of the number,” is portrayed 
as the cause of a vast wave of immorality and investment misallocation. 
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any bad outcome to short-termism. Such attributions are hard to disprove on the casual 
level at which such issues are typically discussed.  
 In summary, the ideology of anti-short-termism is popular not because it makes 
sense, nor even because it benefits interested parties. It is just good at being popular.   
 
Conspiracy Theories 
Hazards that are potentially catastrophic but whose workings are unseen or poorly 
understood are especially disturbing (hence the greater public concern about death by 
insecticide, genetically modified food, or nuclear energy than by car accident). Such fear 
of the unknown provides a motivation for finance models built upon ‘uncertainty 
aversion’, ‘ambiguity aversion’, or ‘familiarity bias.’  
The dread of hidden menace is a natural precursor to conspiracy theories. 
Conspiracy theories are assemblies of memes that claim that some villainous group has 
the power and intent to do harm. Conspiracy theories are reinforced by xenophobic 
instincts, and gain support during hard times and social disruption. 
During market crashes, conspiracy theories have included accusations that foreign 
enemies were engaged in bear raids on U.S. markets (Chancellor 2001). There are also 
persistent (and often influential) claims that an international cabal of Jewish bankers or 
speculators control the financial system. Receptiveness to conspiracy theories about the 
financial system may derive from the fact that it is complicated and poorly understood.  
 Financial markets and institutions can be intimidating to outsiders for several 
reasons—their specialized jargon, sensational media descriptions of market fluctuations, 
and genuine, seemingly uncontrollable risks of market crashes or bank runs. Most 
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individual investors do not understand how the actions of major players in financial 
markets affect these risks is not well-understood. Speculators such as hedge fund 
managers are suspect since they operate in secrecy, and are often foreigners.  
The idea that a market crash can result from the interaction of many individuals, 
no single one of whom is powerful, is unintuitive. Our general disposition to attribute 
outcomes to deliberate intent serves us well in personal life, but leads to error in 
analyzing social interaction in markets. We are predisposed toward perceiving market 
crashes as resulting from intentional manipulation by powerful individuals or groups.  
Conspiracy theories provide simple, easily understood explanations, and allow the 
adopter of such theories to feel perceptive and special.  
  
8. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
The psychological attraction theory of regulation holds that regulation is the 
result of psychological biases on the part of political participants and regulators, and the 
evolution of regulatory ideologies that exploit these biases. The main alternative theory, 
the rational self-interest approach, faces two puzzles which suggest that it also implicitly 
relies on psychological bias. 
First, most people would deny that self-interest is their primary political 
motivation. Indeed, individuals altruistically donate time and funds to their favored 
pressure groups.15 Thus, what is commonly interpreted by political economists as rational 
self-interested lobbying is actually a more interesting combination of selfish and altruistic 
motives.  
                                                 
15 There is also evidence that individuals tend to take political positions based on principle, not pecuniary 
self interest (Sears and Funk 1991). 
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The second puzzle is how successful pressure groups manage to fool other voters 
systematically over long periods of time. To understand how competition between 
pressure groups works, we need to consider explicitly how these groups enlist 
psychological biases on their sides. 
The psychological attraction theory also helps explain why some kinds of 
regulatory mistakes are not quickly reversed. For example, regulation that deters 
innovation makes its potential benefits invisible. This helps explain why the citizens of 
many countries tolerate regulation that deters young firms from going public.  
An implication of the psychological attraction approach to regulation is that 
regulatory responses to perceived problems will often be ineffective. Indeed, we often 
expect to see friendly fire incidents in which investor-protection regulation hurts the 
investors it is supposed to help. A rational pressure group theory does not capture such 
effects, since such an outcome involves political participants being systematically wrong 
about the true intent and consequences of regulation. 
The psychological attraction theory also implies that bad regulatory outcomes can 
result even when all political participants have unselfish intentions; and that regulations 
can reinforce individual level biases. Furthermore, since the universe of possible 
tempting regulations is unlimited, the theory predicts a general tendency for 
overregulation, and for rules to accrete over time like barnacles, impeding economic 
progress. The theory also predicts occasional drastic increases in regulation in response to 
market downturns or disruption. 
 One specific source of bad regulation is misapplication of the charity norm to 
market exchange. The charity norm condemns sellers who charge high prices, and lenders 
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who charge high interest rates, to the poor or recently distressed. This motivates price 
controls, which block mutually beneficial transactions. For example, usury laws prevent 
the poor and distressed from obtaining loans (a possible outcome of recent regulatory 
attention in the U.S. to the subprime mortgage industry), and price gouging regulation 
creates shortages of essential goods in times of disaster. Of course, the poor and 
distressed are often defrauded, which is both a violation of the charity norm (and the 
reciprocity norm) and a hindrance to economic efficiency. However, setting aside fraud 
prevention, regulation based on the charity norm has an anti-surplus and anti-insurance 
effects. The charity norm draws attention away from alternative means of assisting the 
poor and insuring against distress that avoid these drawbacks. 
 
Policy Implications 
My purpose today has been to offer a positive theory of regulation. In my 
remaining time I will discuss policy implications. The psychological attraction approach 
to regulation implies that meta-policy matters. Building inertia into the political system 
constrains the effects of psychological biases on future policy decisions. This helps, 
because irrational pressure for a bad regulation is often transient, as is the case with 
availability cascades. Systemic inertia can be achieved through constitutional limitations 
such as separation of powers, irrevocable rights, and supermajority rules; sunset 
provisions are also useful. These notions are quite consistent with the liberal tradition in 
political philosophy. 
Such proposals are familiar from the rational public choice literature (Buchanan 
and Tullock 1962). However, a broader line of liberal political thought makes 
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irrationality an essential part of the case for representative government. For example, The 
Federalist Papers numbers 10 and 63 discuss how to limit the effects of the passions of 
factions and of the public as a whole. 
Ending a talk with a call for further research is an academic cliché. Nevertheless, I 
want to persuade you that it is vital to explore this uncharted continent of psychological 
attraction and regulation. As political participants, we cannot start correcting our errors 
until we recognize them.  
John Maynard Keynes famously discussed how “…the ideas of economists and 
political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more 
powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else.” There 
can be no doubt that he was right. In the 18th century, Adam Smith clarified the role of 
exchange in creating wealth, and shifted political discourse and legislation toward laissez 
faire. In the 19th and 20th centuries, Karl Marx and others helped build anti-market 
ideologies of extraordinary contagiousness and virulence, with even more momentous 
effects. In the 21st century, an understanding of how psychology affects the political 
process can help immunize us against pernicious ideologies, and increase the role of 
reason in political and regulatory decisions.   
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